

Governing Body (public) meeting

DATE: 29 May 2014

Title	Disaster Recovery Report
Recommended action for the Governing Body	<p>That the Governing Body:</p> <p>NOTE the outcomes of the CCG's first Disaster Recovery Test that took place on the 6th May 2014 as detailed below.</p>
Executive summary	<p>Introduction/Context:</p> <p>The CCG undertook its first Disaster Recovery test of its critical business systems on the 6th May 2014. The CCG's disaster recovery centre has recently been fully deployed at the Erith Health Centre site and this exercise was to test access to the CCG's IT servers and systems in the event of a major incident taking place rendering the Head Quarters site at 221 Erith Road becoming unavailable to staff and access to systems being diverted to the disaster recovery site at Erith Health Centre.</p> <p>The main reason for this test was to determine how well the CCG can respond to an incident and regain business as usual under extenuating circumstances. The outcome of which is described below.</p> <p>Prior to the exercise being run, Directors had been asked to nominate key staff to support the DR process on the day of the test. The main requirements being to test how key CCG systems could be accessed away from the 221 Erith Road site using a set of different scenarios, such as Working from home on a laptop, working from an iPad, working from a fixed desktop located within an N3 area, i.e. GP practice or other Trust site.</p> <p>Outcomes of the Disaster Recovery Test:</p> <p>On the day of the DR test, staff arrived to work without any knowledge that an incident was going to take place that day. The alert was triggered at 11:35am on the morning of the 6th</p>

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May via an SMS notification text to all Directors and Assistant Directors.

The notification was then cascaded via the senior management teams to their line reports, either verbally or by forwarding the text to the relevant staff in their teams.

The outcomes summary attached illustrates the following findings:

- All staff within the CCG on the day had been informed of the test, either via the SMS alert received or by a systematic walk round of the building by the Chief Officer or the Director of Governance.

It was noted that being a small organisation, it is highly likely that both the Director and Assistant Directors could be out of the office at the same time when an incident occurs, however this would be mitigated by an Executive who would cascade to other Directorates in the absence of colleagues and staff as necessary.

Additionally, dependant on the timing of the incident, this would also play a factor in the cascade process of the organisation, particularly if the incident were to take place over a weekend. In this instance, the process would be to inform staff using electronic communications (emails/text messages) and mobile devices (phone calls) to deliver the message to staff.

- Those staff nominated to support the DR test on the day were all informed and in the DR test room within 10 minutes of the incident notification.
- The majority of systems tested were all accessible using the DR equipment based at Erith Health Centre, apart from the following two key systems; NHS Mail and SBS. Both systems are externally hosted systems and were not anticipated to have caused any issues, however since the test, the relevant technical configuration has now been set up on the DR site so that these issues will not arise again.

In conclusion, it was felt that the overall DR exercise to test the accessibility of the systems and servers on the CCG's DR site



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	<p>worked well with the exception of the two systems highlighted above.</p> <p>The cascading process worked well in ensuring that all staff were informed either by the senior management of their own Directorate, or in their absence, by another senior Executive of the CCG.</p> <p>The CCG's Disaster Recovery process will be routinely tested on an annual basis.</p>	
Which objective does this paper support?	<p>Patients: Improve the health and wellbeing of people in Bexley in partnership with our key stakeholders</p>	
	<p>People: Empower our staff to make NHS Bexley CCG the most successful CCG in (south) London</p>	✓
	<p>Pounds: Delivering on all of our statutory duties and become an effective, efficient and economical organisation</p>	✓
	<p>Process: Commission safe, sustainable and equitable services in line with the operating framework and which improves outcomes and patient experience</p>	✓
Organisational implications	<p>Key risks (corporate and/or clinical)</p>	Without routine business continuity and disaster recovery tests being undertaken, the CCG could be at risk of key systems becoming inaccessible to staff during a major incident that may trigger longer term effects on business as usual.
	Equality and diversity	N/A
	Patient impact	N/A
	Financial	Dependant on the level and length of incident there may be financial implications to bear.
	Legal issues	N/A
	NHS constitution	N/A
Consultation (public, member or other)	N/A	
Audit	N/A	

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(considered/approved by other committees/groups)		
Communications plan	N/A	
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	Clinical lead Dr Howard Stoate CCG Chair	Executive sponsor Simon Evans-Evans Director of Governance and Quality
Date	15 th May 2014	

SCENARIO TESTING OUTCOMES SUMMARY	
Staff involved in the testing:	Abi Ademoyero, Alison Rogers, Christine Taylor, Jon Winters, Joyce Dukes, Mary Stoneham, Sue Sitch, Pauline Wortman
Time of notification from alert:	All received a notification within 10 minutes of the alert being sent.
How staff received the notification:	3 received via text message 5 verbal communications
Systems required to continue business working?	Network access (O Drive)(Micro soft) Internet NHS Mail Outlook e-mail Shared Business Services (SBS) BPS Safeguard
Was a Disaster Recovery Icon present on the PC?	7 - yes 1 – once contact was made with ICT
Any difficulties accessing systems	NHS Mail SBS
Contact made to other members of staff to assist in the process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 member made contact with their staff to notify of incident. • The remaining majority required ICT support.
Any other comments?	Could not access SBS.

